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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

DISPATCH		REF ID: A68487	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. BMA 45926
TO	Chief, IE	DECLASSIFIED BY: 70-17	US DISPATCH FILE NO. 100-6-101/1- Field File UJNUTLET
INFO	COS/O Chief of Base, Berlin SR		
FROM	Chief of Base, Munich	DATE	12 November 1959
SUBJECT	UPSWING/CART/LINDBROOK/Operational UJNUTLET Operation	IS "43-3" (CHECK "2" ONLY)	INDEXED FOR INDEXING
ACTION REQUIRED	None, for your information.	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ DESK ONLY
<p>REFERENCES:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> A. BMA 36747, 8 September 1958 B. MWT 502, 22 July 1959 C. BMA 6241, 21 August 1959 D. MWT 6319, 15 September 1959 <p><u>INTRODUCTION:</u></p> <p>1. Except for references B and D, there has been no reporting on a regular basis on the UJNUTLET case since reference A. The monthly summaries of MB/LB/CE have touched on certain aspects of the case as appropriate, however. But since these are not sent to BOB or SR Division, there follows a brief summary of events as they have occurred since September 1958. Communication between the KGB and UJNUTLET from late 1956 or early 1957 until February 1959 was solely by S/W and microdot. (The courier Max never reappeared in Munich). The agent's targets remained the same until his deepest penetration of UPSWING and reporting on the activities of the "Arbeitskreis fuer Osten". The latter was, as we understand it, pretty much "dry work". There was never any doubt that UJNUTLET's chief job for the KGB was to penetrate UPSWING. Since this was to be accomplished through cultivation and eventual recruitment of V-2982, UJNUTLET's UPSWING case officer, the operation proceeded at a slow pace despite some vague rumors that SCHNEIDER had been developing in mid 1958 to build up a Scheinnetz around V-2982 in an effort to create a deception-type operation. With the death in September 1958 of the agent's wife and his resulting low morale, the operation slowed down to a snail's pace. The KGB, like UPSWING, was sympathetic and did not press him for reports or results for several weeks. Early in November 1958 SCHNEIDER was made responsible for the Headquarters aspect of the operation. This was the signal for a more aggressive type of UPSWING handling, and late in that month UJNUTLET was instructed to write to his KGB case officer that V-2982 had asked the agent to act as a letter drop for him. At the same time, the KGB was informed that V-2982 had told UJNUTLET that he was chief of a special UPSWING Dienststelle which ran operations in the Baltic and North Sea areas using a large number of ship personnel as sources. The KGB response to this information showed that they were very much interested but expressed concern that UPSWING might be laying a trap for UJNUTLET to determine if he really might be in touch with the Soviets. He was told not to tamper in any way with the letters but to report regularly on the volume of the mail, place of origin, any names given as senders, etc.</p> <p>2. In February 1959, UPSWING instructed UJNUTLET to write to his cover address saying that he strongly wished a meeting with his case officer. The KGB replied by saying that he should come to East Berlin on 22 February. The reason for his wanting a meeting was stated to be his concern over new indications that the old war crimes charge against him showed signs of coming to life again. Also, UJNUTLET complained that he was still having great difficulty in reading the microdots the KGB sent him (this was true and had been the subject of earlier correspondence to the KGB). On the first score, the case officer, Heinz MAISKY, said he could not do much more than commiserate with UJNUTLET but would check to see if anything could be done in Moscow to get at least the Soviet charges dropped (UJNUTLET had vehemently denied that he was in any way responsible for the shooting of several Red Army officers during the war). On the second score, MAISKY replied by saying that the KGB had decided the case had come to the point where a more permanent communications arrangement should be established that in the</p>			
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future OWVL would be the means. UJNUTLET was instructed in this during his brief stay in East Berlin, and since that time until his suicide, OWVL was used by the KGB instead of microdots.

3. No unusual developments occurred during the Spring months of 1959 except that in April the agent was told by the KGB to write a letter to UTILITY indicating his desire to get a job with UPSWING. Since UJNUTLET did not actually know UTILITY slightly (PRIESEN said that they had met one or two times during the war) a personal letter would not seem particularly unusual. After an appropriate interval, PRIESEN drafted a letter signed, theoretically, by a front office type and had it given to UJNUTLET who was told to relay the message to the KGB. It was, in effect, an statement that although someone with UJNUTLET's high qualifications would make a useful contribution to UPSWING's effort, UTILITY regretted that until the war crimes charge matter was settled, employment with UPSWING was not possible. (COMMENT: The KGB should not have been in the least surprised at this sort of a response. Considering the fact that the charge was a very painful thing to UJNUTLET - as time proved - it seems somewhat unusual and a bit grotesque that PRIESEN should have written a letter to UJNUTLET on such a literal basis. PRIESEN, a fellow alumnus of the RSHA along with UJNUTLET and V-2982, could have prepared a less cold-blooded reply to the effect that there were no vacancies at the moment for a person with the rank that UJNUTLET would have to be given, but the matter would be kept under consideration, etc. As a matter of fact, this was the line that the undersigned and PRIESEN had discussed when the KGB instruction was first learned about. We can only speculate as to the reason for the change. At any rate, it would seem that this other approach would have served to keep the KGB more hopeful or interested and at the same time would not have rubbed salt in old UJNUTLET wounds). Also during the Spring PRIESEN served notice that we would probably get less information on this case than we had in the past due to its increasing sensitivity. (COMMENT: The fact that PRIESEN meant this is rather well borne out by the story he was willing to tell after the agent's death - see below).

UJNUTLET'S SUICIDE:

4. With the exception of the information noted in reference B, nothing else of significance took place in the operation until we were informed by reference C that UJNUTLET had committed suicide. The reason why this fact was not first reported by Munich Base was that PRIESEN was on leave at the time, as was the undersigned. Since the case has not been discussed among any other persons, there was an inevitable delay before we got the story. PRIESEN gave us the following account: In order to provide some form of protection for UJNUTLET against legal proceedings connected with the war crimes charge, UPSWING obtained the agreement of RIEDMAYR of the LfV to front for UPSWING in briefing a high official of the Bavarian Justice Ministry so that no action would be taken against UJNUTLET at least without the prior knowledge of intelligence authorities. Because of the sensitivity of the case, only one person, apparently, was cut in at the Justice Ministry. It was unfortunate that he, too, was on leave at the time a Federal order was issued for UJNUTLET's arrest which, when it reached the ministry in Munich, was acted upon promptly and did not receive the special treatment that had been arranged for by the LfV at the request of UPSWING. Accordingly, the arrest warrant was served on UJNUTLET on 6 August. He immediately dispatched himself with a dose of poison. When UPSWING learned about this, there resulted, of course, a large furor and a quick investigation which revealed, simply, that the one man who could have delayed the arrest was out of town at the time and had taken no prior action to forestall an arrest should he not be there personally to attend to the matter.

5. When asked by the undersigned why he thought UJNUTLET had been so quick to take poison, PRIESEN said that the agent had been in a very depressed mood for some time and had shown signs of emotional instability. He had been particularly worried by the war crimes charge which had hung over his head for a long time, at times seeming to be very threatening and at others

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seeming to be only a technicality which would probably never materialize. Apparently, UJNOTELET had alternated between hope and despair for many months. This coupled with the long strain of his wife's painful disease and her ultimate death plus the effects of many years in a Soviet prison, not to mention the tensions inevitably caused by double agent activity, all served to make him crack at that moment when he must have felt that there was little left for him in life but probably further imprisonment. In a discussion at a later time with @Dr. KLAUSNER when we said that despite the above, one would think that UJNOTELET might at least have been expected to yell for UPSWING help, the reply was that perhaps the agent felt that such would be futile if he had indeed not been on the level with UPSWING - in other words, he may have felt the whole show was over in any event. This was the first time that the undersigned had ever heard any doubt expressed about UJNOTELET's loyalties vis a vis UPSWING. Actually, Dr. KLAUSNER admitted that this idea of his was merely conjecture and that he had no evidence to show that UJNOTELET had not been on the level with UPSWING.

FUTURE OF THE OPERATION:

6. PRIESEN said that despite the death of UJNOTELET, there is a possibility that the operation is not finished. He explained that the agent's brother, Josef, (No Munich Base traces; current Munich telephone book lists him as a Regierungs-Oberinspektor, Hoelderlinstrasse 10, Munich 25 Telephone Number 76 10 88) a Bavarian government official, was talked to by UPSWING immediately after UJNOTELET's suicide and was told in general terms that his brother had been UPSWING-connected, etc. Josef readily agreed to UPSWING's proposal to write to UJNOTELET's KGB letter drop in Berlin, announcing the fact of the death, that the cover address had been found in the deceased's effects and, as is customary in such circumstances, all friends and acquaintances are informed of the family's bereavement, etc. Approximately ten days after sending the letter, Josef received a reply signed "Ingrid Mueller" (UJNOTELET's cover addressee). She expressed her regrets and her fondness for the departed. She added that she planned to make a trip to the Federal Republic sometime in the near future (it would be a trip of fairly long duration) and would like to call upon Josef. PRIESEN was asked if he thought this indicated a KGB interest in the brother. He replied that he thought, no, Josef held no particular interest for the opposition but that they might simply want to check to see how knowledgeable he is about UJNOTELET's late activities, additional details about the death, etc. - in short, an attempt to ascertain if, with UJNOTELET's expiration, his connections with the KGB had in any way become exposed.

7. In this regard, PRIESEN was asked what the relationship had been between the two brothers, and if Josef was the inheritor of UJNOTELET's estate. PRIESEN said the relationship had not been close - albeit not unfriendly - due largely to the feelings of Josef's wife who disliked UJNOTELET. UJNOTELET left his entire estate to a lady friend who had been close to Mrs. UJNOTELET. UJNOTELET, it seems, became very close to this woman after the death of his wife in 1958. When asked by Josef for a statement of his brother - the request was for a chair - the heiress (legal sense) turned him down flat. Discreet UPSWING inquiries about some of UJNOTELET's possessions (a microscope type of device, for instance) (COMMENT: It will be recalled that all S/W and related equipment UPSWING allowed him to retain) got the reply from the lady friend that she knew perfectly well what was meant, that she knew a good deal about UJNOTELET's true status, that she could read him like a book, but that UPSWING need have no fear, she had said nothing to anyone about this and would not (UPSWING made her sign a secrecy agreement to this effect). She also said she knew that V-2502 was not just a friend but was his Western intelligence contact (she was not infrequently in the company of both men). Regarding the microscope, this simply got lost; other materials were readily turned over to UPSWING. (COMMENT: What the KGB will think, or wonder, about these items and the possibility that somebody could have found them in UJNOTELET's belongings can only be guessed at).

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8. In talking further about the future, if any, of this operation against UPSWING, FRIESEN said he thinks the KGB might see an advantage in the demise of UJNUTLET. Since the latter's target and means of penetration of UPSWING was V-2982, his case officer, the KGB might feel a direct approach is now, or in the future, in order. The reasoning is this: UJNUTLET reported considerable cleared material on V-2982 to the KGB; however, he could logically state he could not push his relationship too far or V-2982 would become suspicious of UJNUTLET's purposes. Thus, while the agent was the avenue to the target, he necessarily and by definition stood between the target and the KGB. The KGB, FRIESEN thinks, might reason that they already have enough information about V-2982 and his apparent indiscretions to make a direct pitch possible. FRIESEN said that he could conceive of the KGB contacting V-2982 and making reference to the many items of information they have been able to collect on him which would be highly damaging should UPSWING be informed. The KGB would be able to state in detail all V-2982 had said about UPSWING's knowledge of KGB activities at the Geneva conference, what was learned about V-2982's own operational activities, and in general, what had been picked up through UJNUTLET to show that V-2982 seriously violated many basic rules of the intelligence business.

9. FRIESEN said he thought that depending upon the forcefulness of the KGB pitch and the response V-2982 could logically be expected to make under the circumstances, the KGB might go so far as to reveal their knowledge that V-2982 is a Kriegsverbrecher as far as the Austrians - sic - are concerned who do not know his present whereabouts but would like to. (COMMENT: This was the first we had heard about such an aspect of V-2982's background. The fact that UPSWING allowed UJNUTLET to pass the information to the KGB (which we understand they did) indicates the rather surprising extent to which UPSWING has gone in rendering V-2982 an attractive target to the KGB. We were never given many details about how much build-up material was passed, but we can only infer from the Kriegsverbrecher item that a good deal of information must have been sent to the KGB). FRIESEN said that in his planning for the eventuality of a KGB approach, the latter might possibly indicate they know (fact or assumption) that UJNUTLET had not been on the level with the KGB. If this line should be pursued, FRIESEN thinks the KGB would say, in effect, "So what if he was not completely on the level with us, so what if some of the information we got from him was only UPSWING build-up material? UPSWING could not protect him from legal action and therefore there is no reason to suppose they could protect you if we tip off the Austrians". As will be seen from paragraph 4 above, the KGB, in this vein, would arrive at the right conclusion but by the wrong means. (COMMENT: Although this reasoning is attractive in some respects, it does not allow for a V-2982 reply to the effect that if UJNUTLET was indeed a double under KGB control, why did not the KGB protect his status? In other words, the KGB really did not do much better than UPSWING as far as the agent's status was concerned - and presumably could have in 1956 by gaining an amnesty grant for him which was not, in fact, obtained. As a "dispatched" agent, this failure on the part of the KGB has always seemed odd since they must have known that he would have had great difficulty in accomplishing his penetration mission if for no other reason than that he could not be rehabilitated so long as war crimes charges, Soviet originated, hung over his head).

10. Be this as it may, the case and its future hang largely, if not entirely, on the KGB's view of V-2982. FRIESEN agrees that further independent efforts might be made by the KGB to get damaging information on V-2982 before a pitch would be made. FRIESEN also thinks it an equally good possibility that the KGB will drop the whole matter. It is interesting to note, however, that if the KGB does try to recruit V-2982, FRIESEN has obtained the necessary permission to have him accept the pitch. Although V-2982 is not a staffer in the sense of the term as such is used in KUBARK and does not have access to classified information held at UPSWING headquarters (except as would be possible under circumstances noted in paragraph 11), this example of their intention to engage in more aggressive operations

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is a reasonably good one. It is safe to say we probably will not get a look at many better ones - if they exist - and there is some reason to doubt that we will see much of this one if it takes the turn FRIESEN still thinks is within the realm of possibility.

11. Returning to the subject of V-2982's "indiscretions". FRIESEN said that UJWUTLET was allowed to pass a fair amount about [] and other defector's revelations. It was in this context that the KGB told UJWUTLET to find out what contacts with the West [] might have had before his defection. (COMMENT: The undersigned's wonderings out loud about why the Americans were not suspected by the KGB in this case brought out FRIESEN's response that the KGB must have assumed through the surfacing technique that a German service had, or could have, been involved. So, since V-2982 himself had raised the subject of [] with UJWUTLET, and thus got the information to the KGB, it seems logical that the KGB would ask the question they did, if for no other reason than to check the degree of V-2982's knowledgeability. Incidentally, he replied, via UJWUTLET, that he did not know if [] had been an UPWING or CAVATA agent prior to defection. He said, under UPWING instruction, that he could probably find out from a friend of his in UPWING headquarters. This info was forwarded to the KGB, but UJWUTLET's death occurred before anything else took place. On this score, FRIESEN said that clearance has indeed been obtained to name a headquarters source for V-2982's information. This person is real and is cited in that he may figure in a high level deception operation. FRIESEN would not identify him except to say that he is in an evaluation [non-CE] sort of job).

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